Introduction
There is a popular belief among decentralists that if local governments have the power to generate and spend revenue, without relying on central government funding, their expenditure will be pro-poor and will improve the lives of local people. Such views have influenced recent calls for greater decentralisation in developing countries in general and Africa in particular. However, evidence from Ghana casts some doubts on this view. A brief comparison of the expenditure and revenue patterns of the poorest and richest local governments there suggests that local governments are not inherently pro-poor and that locally generated funds might be used in ways that do not reflect the needs of the locality as a whole. Thus the fiscal devolution view of decentralisation appears to be out of kilter with reality. To discuss this issue, the three sections in this paper summarise the assumptions and perceived benefits of decentralisation, describe decentralisation in Ghana, and analyse the revenue and expenditure patterns of the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority and the Kasena Nankana District Assembly.
Decentralisation and local governance
Decentralisation involves the transfer of power, whether political, administrative or fiscal in one of four forms: Deconcentration (the handing over of administrative or managerial responsibility to sub-national governments); Delegation (establishing public enterprises and other semi-autonomous bodies to manage sectors like utilities);
Devolution (the transfer of decision-making authority); and Privatisation (the transfer of hitherto state-managed corporations to the private sector) (Martinussen 1997:210-211 However, several evaluations have concluded that in the Third World, especially in Africa, little revenue is generated at the local level. Annually, sub-Saharan African cities generate only US$14 per capita compared to US$2,906 in the highly industrialised countries and US$153 in Asia (UN-Habitat 2001). As such, there is a current flurry of interest in how to increase local revenue mobilisation in Africa. What is often taken for granted is how existing revenue is used and whether the expenditure and revenue patterns of local governments are pro-poor. The prevailing assumption is that local revenue is used in ways that lead to the reduction of poverty levels. Efficiency requires that the validity of this assumption be ascertained before rushing to generate more revenue.
Ghana provides a good 'laboratory' to conduct this 'experiment' because it has a long history of decentralisation.
Decentralisation in Ghana
As part of the economic reforms that were implemented in Ghana in the 1980s, a new system of local governance was adopted. There are currently 170 local governments charged with the responsibility of promoting local economic development. Based on population size, these local governments may be regarded as metropolitan (settlements of over 250,000 people), municipal (settlements of over 95,000 people), or district assemblies (settlements of over 75,000 people). There are 6 metropolitan authorities, 39 municipal authorities and 125 district assemblies (Obeng-Odoom 2009). These local governments face several problems, including the lack of requisite technocrats, especially planners; logistical constraints; and, the lack of autonomy from central government (Lentz, 2006; Mensah 2005) . Of all these problems, revenue generation is the most challenging, prompting many decentralists and planners (e.g. Mensah, 2005) to suggest possible ways of attaining more revenues for the assemblies. But, again, how effectively the little revenue generated has been put to use remains an unanswered question.
Financial trends: Two local governments compared
The revenue and expenditure patterns of one of the richest local governments in Ghanathe Kumasi Metropolitan Authority -was analysed alongside one of the poorest, the Kasena Nankana District Assembly. In the Kasena Nankana District Assembly, capital expenditure has decreased over time, from 83% in 2003 to 12.5% in 2006, while recurrent expenditure (internal costs of running the council) has increased from 17% to over 87% over the same period, as shown in table 1: Central government grants to local governments are also far from being spent in a propoor manner. Table 2 shows that until 2006, the Kasena Nankana District Assembly spent the bulk of its revenue on 'good governance', which, from the reports of the assembly, seems to be defined as the administration of local government offices. 
